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OPINION OF THE COURT  
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
This case concerns the bankruptcy proceedings of Eric J. Blatstein 
("Blatstein") and the attempt by one of 
his creditors joined by bankruptcy trustees to bring assets into his 
bankruptcy estate. The creditor, 718 Arch 
Street Associates, Ltd. ("Arch Street"), brought these adversary 
proceedings in the bankruptcy court 
accusing Blatstein of fraudulently transferring his income and his shares 
in a number of corporations in the 
restaurant and bar businesses he controlled to his wife, Lori J. 
Blatstein. Arch Street also asked the 
bankruptcy court to reverse pierce the veils of the corporations so as to 
bring their assets into the 
bankruptcy estates. The trustees of the Blatstein bankruptcy estate and of 
the bankruptcy estate of Main, 
Inc. ("Main"), one of the Blatsteins' jointly-held corporations, have 
intervened as plaintiffs in this action. Arch 
Street predicated its piercing the veil argument on the contention that 
the corporations were Blatstein's"alter 
egos." As we shall explain, a court in a successful reverse piercing case 
disregards the corporate existence 
so that the corporation's assets become available to a controlling party's 
creditors to satisfy his debts. Thus, 
a reverse piercing case differs from a classical piercing case as in the 
latter the controlling party is 
responsible for the corporation's debts. The bankruptcy court and the 
district court on appeal rejected these 
fraudulent transfer and reverse piercing claims insofar as the claims are 
now before us. Arch Street and the 
trustees then appealed to this court. We will reverse in part, as we find 
that Eric Blatstein fraudulently 
transferred his income to his wife in an effort to keep the money from his 
creditors. We, however, will affirm 
in part, as we conclude that the bankruptcy and district courts correctly 
found that there had not been a 
fraudulent transfer of corporate shares and correctly refused to pierce 
the corporate veils.  
 
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE  
 
This case grew out of Main's September 20, 1996 voluntary Chapter 11 
petition. See In re Main, Inc., 213 
B.R. 67, 72 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997) ("Main II"), rev'd in part and aff'd in 
part sub nom., In re Blatstein, 226 
B.R. 140 (E.D. Pa. 1998).1 Main converted its case from a Chapter 11 to a 
Chapter 7 proceeding after a 
December 18, 1996 hearing in the bankruptcy court on a motion to dismiss 
its petition. Blatstein then filed a 
personal Chapter 7 proceeding on December 19, 1996.  
 
Arch Street subsequently brought these adversary proceedings in both the 
Blatstein and Main bankruptcy 
cases against Eric and Lori Blatstein, Morris Lift, who was the 
Blatsteins' accountant and Main's president, 
and the Blatsteins' various jointly-held corporations.2 For 
_________________________________________________________________  
 
1. We are using the numerical designation of the Main bankruptcy cases as 
the parties and the bankruptcy 
court have used them even though we do not refer to all the Main cases.  
 
2. These corporations are Delawareco, Inc., Engine 46 Steak House Inc., 
Reedco, Inc., Waterfront 
Management Corporation, Columbusco, Inc., simplicity's sake, however, we 
will refer to the appellees 
collectively as "Blatstein" or "the Blatsteins," as appropriate in the 
context. Michael H. Kaliner, trustee of the 
Blatstein bankruptcy estate, and Mitchell Miller, trustee of the Main 
bankruptcy estate, intervened as 
plaintiffs in the proceedings and are appellants here. Nevertheless, we 
will refer to the appellants collectively 
as "Arch Street."  
 
Before filing these proceedings, 718 Arch Street Associates, Ltd. obtained 
a judgment by confession in state 
court against Blatstein individually on November 12, 1992, for $2,774,803 
on account of a breach of a 
commercial lease. Subsequently, in connection with garnishment proceedings 
to enforce the judgment, the 
state court entered the judgment against Main.  
 
In its complaints in the bankruptcy court, Arch Street alleged, inter 
alia, that Lori Blatstein was not truly a 
co- owner of the corporations, Blatstein fraudulently transferred all of 
his income from the corporations to 
her to avoid paying his creditors, Blatstein fraudulently transferred 
Main's assets to Lift and other 
corporations he controlled, and the Blatsteins' corporations were 
Blatstein's alter egos and should be held 
responsible for his debts.  
 
The bankruptcy court held that Blatstein fraudulently conveyed his assets 
in Main to Lift and other 
corporations Blatstein controlled in a ruling which is not before us for 
review. Accordingly, pursuant to 11 
U.S.C. SS 727(a)(2)(A) and (a)(7) the bankruptcy court refused to 
discharge him. Main II, 213 B.R. at 85. 
The court, however, rejected Arch Street's arguments that the corporate 
defendants were the alter egos 
either of Blatstein or of each other and that Blatstein fraudulently 
transferred his assets to his wife. Id. at 
87-95. The bankruptcy court on further proceedings, which included Arch 
Street's motion for 
reconsideration of the order in Main II, calculated Arch Street's claim 
for rents due as $582,443.65. In re 
Main, Inc., 1997 WL 626544, at 
_________________________________________________________________  
 
Airbev, Inc., and Pier 53 North, Inc. The bankruptcy court found that all 
the corporate defendants were 
Pennsylvania corporations jointly owned by Eric and Lori Blatstein as 
tenants by the entireties. See Main II, 
213 B.R. at 74. *12 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 1997) ("Main III"). The court 
partially granted the motion for 
reconsideration with respect to the procedural implementation of the order 
in Main II but did not disturb the 
substantive dispositions we have described.  
 
On appeal, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's rejection 
both of Arch Street's claims that the 
Blatsteins' corporations were Blatstein's alter egos and that he had 
fraudulently transferred his corporate 
shares and income to his wife, but reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings in the bankruptcy court 
that court's ruling that Blatstein fraudulently transferred Main's assets. 
In re Blatstein, 226 B.R. 140, 148 
(E.D. Pa. 1998). 3 Arch Street now appeals the district court's order 
affirming the bankruptcy court's ruling 
against its alter ego and fraudulent transfer claims. As we have 
indicated, we will reverse in part and affirm in 
part.  
 
III. DISCUSSION  
 
Arch Street contends that the district court erred in rejecting the 
fraudulent transfer claims because the court 
failed to take into account (1) Blatstein's insolvency at the time of the 
transfers, (2) the Blatsteins' fraudulent 
intention in effectuating the transfers, and (3) Lori Blatstein's failure 
to prove that she gave reasonably 
equivalent value for the transfers. Arch Street contends that because of 
these legal errors, the district court 
erroneously failed to recognize that Arch Street had proven that the 
transfers were fraudulent as a matter of 
law.  
 
Arch Street also contends, on the theory that the Blatsteins' corporations 
were his alter egos, that the district 
court erred in affirming the bankruptcy court's refusal to pierce the 
corporate veils. Arch Street argues that 
the court did not account properly for its contentions that (1) the 
corporations operated as facades for 
Blatstein, (2) Blatstein 
_________________________________________________________________  
 
3. On remand, the bankruptcy court reconsidered its opinion, yet once 
again concluded that the transfer of 
Main's assets was fraudulent. In re Main, 1998 WL 778017, at *14-*16 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 1998) 
("Main V"). used the corporations to hinder, delay, and defraud his 
creditors, and (3) Blatstein commingled 
corporate funds with his personal funds.  
 
Blatstein initially argues, however, that we should not reach the merits 
of the appeal as we lack jurisdiction to 
do so. Because this jurisdictional argument would require us to dismiss 
the appeal without considering the 
case on the merits, we will deal with it first. Alternatively, Blatstein 
urges that we affirm the district court's 
order.  
 
A. Standard of Review  
 
We exercise plenary review over the question of whether we have 
jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. See 
In re Meyertech Corp., 831 F.2d 410, 413-14 (3d Cir. 1987). Likewise, we 
have plenary review over the 
district court's application of legal precepts. See In re Brown , 951 F.2d 
564, 567 (3d Cir. 1991). On the 
other hand, we review the bankruptcy court's factual findings for clear 
error. See id. See also In re Forcroft 
Square Co., 184 B.R. 671, 675 (E.D. Pa. 1995) ("[T]he determination of 
whether there is . . . intent to 
defraud [under Pennsylvania law] is a finding of fact which should not be 
set aside on appellate review unless 
that finding was clearly erroneous.") (citing United States v. Tabor Ct. 
Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1304 
(3d Cir. 1986); In re Adeeb, 787 F.2d 1339, 1342 (9th Cir. 1986)).  
 
B. Whether our jurisdiction is properly invoked  
 
As we have indicated, before reaching the merits of this dispute we first 
must determine whether we have 
jurisdiction. This jurisdictional issue is implicated because the district 
court's order in part remanded the case 
for further proceedings in the bankruptcy court. Moreover, there will be 
additional proceedings involving 
numerous issues with respect to the bankruptcy estates in both the 
district and bankruptcy courts.  
 
In bankruptcy cases, we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) 
over appeals from "final 
decisions, judgments, orders, and decrees entered," as here, by a district 
court in its appellate capacity 
under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). Yet, we have recognized that in a bankruptcy 
context we consider the question 
of whether an order or judgment is final "in a more pragmatic and less 
technical sense than in other matters. . 
. ." Meyertech Corp., 831 F.2d at 414. Determining whether an appellant 
has invoked our jurisdiction 
properly entails "balancing a general reluctance to expand traditional 
interpretations regarding finality and a 
desire to effectuate a practical termination of the matter before us." Id. 
The relevant factors consist of (1) the 
impact of our consideration of the merits of the appeal upon the assets of 
the bankrupt estate, (2) the 
necessity for further fact-finding on remand, (3) the preclusive effect of 
a decision on the merits on further 
litigation, and (4) whether the interest of judicial economy would be 
furthered by the exercise of jurisdiction. 
Id. We have held that the impact upon the assets of the estate is the 
"most important" factor in this balancing 
scheme. See In re Market Square Inn, Inc., 978 F.2d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 
1992).  
 
Applying these factors here, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to 
consider Arch Street's appeal, as all 
four factors weigh in favor of our exercise of jurisdiction. First and 
foremost, this appeal concerns identifying 
assets of Blatstein's estate. Plainly, a reversal of the district court's 
order and a determination that Blatstein 
fraudulently conveyed his assets to his wife or that the Blatsteins' 
corporations are his alter egos, would 
result in the inclusion in his bankruptcy estate of substantial assets 
which then would be available to satisfy, at 
least in part, his creditors' claims. On the other hand, if we were to 
affirm the district court's order, the assets 
in the estate effectively would be determined.  
 
Second, contrary to Blatstein's assertion in his brief, we find no need 
for additional fact-finding on remand. 
This appeal concerns three overarching matters, two involving fraudulent 
transfers and one involving piercing 
corporate veils, none of which will be duplicated in further proceedings 
in the district or bankruptcy courts, 
and none of which depends upon any facts still at issue or which will be 
determined during subsequent 
proceedings. Third, there can be no question but that our decision will be 
preclusive. Finally, we serve 
judicial economy by consideration of these claims. Thus, we conclude that 
we have jurisdiction and will 
consider this appeal on the merits. See In re Simpson, 36 F.3d 450, 452 
(5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) 
(exercising jurisdiction over a trustee's appeal of a district court's 
order reversing the bankruptcy court's 
finding of a fraudulent transfer of an asset).  
 
C. The fraudulent transfer claims  
 
1. An overview  
 
The bankruptcy court rejected Arch Street's claims that Blatstein 
fraudulently transferred his stock in the 
jointly owned corporations and his income derived from the businesses to 
Lori Blatstein. In this regard it 
reasoned that all of the stock certificates indicated that the Blatsteins 
owned the corporations as tenants by 
the entireties and had so owned them since their inception. Moreover, it 
accepted Lori Blatstein's testimony 
that the couple had opened her personal bank account and deposited 
Blatstein's income into it because of 
his bad reputation with banks and to avoid a federal tax lien on 
Blatstein's assets. Main II, 213 B.R. at 
93-95. The bankruptcy court's decision rested, then, upon its belief that 
(1) Blatstein did not transfer assets 
to Lori Blatstein, and (2) if there were any transfers from Blatstein to 
Lori Blatstein, then in making the 
transfers Blatstein did not possess an actual intent to defraud his 
creditors under Pennsylvania law which the 
parties agree is applicable.  
 
On reconsideration, the bankruptcy court again rejected Arch Street's 
fraudulent transfer claims. Main III, 
1997 WL 626544, at *4-*6. This time the court rejected a "constructive 
fraud" theory of intent by pointing 
out that Blatstein's income came from the corporations the Blatsteins co-
owned, and thus "were not the 
same as paychecks from a third-party employer," but instead "could be 
viewed as distributions of dividends 
or equity from the corporations. . . ." Id. at *6. Therefore, the court 
implicitly found that Blatstein did not 
transfer any earned income to Lori when he deposited his income into her 
personal accounts. Moreover, 
inasmuch as Lori used these deposits to satisfy the Blatsteins' joint 
obligations and the debts of the various 
corporations, the court found it "impossible, on this record, to find that 
`reasonably equivalent value' was not 
given to Blatstein and the corporations in exchange for their deposits 
into these accounts." Id. The district 
court affirmed the bankruptcy court's findings on these issues. Blatstein, 
226 B.R. at 159-60.  
 
On this appeal, Arch Street contends that the bankruptcy court's factual 
findings should have led that court 
to conclude that Blatstein possessed an actual intent to defraud his 
creditors when he issued stock in Lori's 
name and when he made deposits into Lori's personal accounts. Arch Street 
also argues that even if we 
were tofind that Blatstein did not actually intend to defraud his 
creditors, we should hold that his transfers 
were fraudulent because they fail Pennsylvania's "constructive fraud" 
analysis applicable in fraudulent transfer 
cases. Arch Street contends that the bankruptcy and district courts erred 
by incorrectly placing the burden 
of proof on it, instead of shifting the burden to Lori to establish by 
clear and convincing evidence either that 
Blatstein was solvent at the time of the transfers or that she gave him 
fair consideration for the conveyances. 
We will affirm the district court's order affirming the bankruptcy court's 
finding that Blatstein did not 
fraudulently transfer corporate shares to his wife, but will reverse the 
district court's order affirming the 
bankruptcy court's finding concerning his income transfers to her personal 
bank account.  
 
Initially on these fraudulent transfer issues we set forth the germane 
state law. The Pennsylvania Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act ("PUFTA") provides that a "transfer made or 
obligation incurred by a debtor is 
fraudulent as to a creditor, . . . if the debtor made the transfer or 
incurred the obligation: (1) with actual intent 
to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor of the debtor; or (2) without 
receiving a reasonably equivalent value 
in exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor" was insolvent 
at the time of the transfer or became 
insolvent as a result of it. 12 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5104 (West 1999). 
The first provision provides for 
liability under an "actual intent" theory of fraud, while the second is a 
"constructive fraud" provision. 2. The 
stock "transfers"  
 
The bankruptcy and district courts rested their holdings on their belief 
that the Blatsteins did not transfer any 
stock between them because they owned all the corporate stock at all times 
from their inception as tenants 
by the entireties. We agree. Pennsylvania defines an"asset" for PUFTA 
purposes as the "property of a 
debtor" but not including "an interest in property held in tenancy by the 
entireties to the extent it is not subject 
to process by a creditor holding a claim against only one tenant." 12 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. §5101(b). Thus, if 
the Blatsteins always owned their corporations as tenants by the 
entireties, Arch Street's allegation that 
Blatstein transferred them to Lori Blatstein to defraud his creditors must 
fail.  
 
We reach this conclusion even in the face of evidence that Blatstein alone 
provided or arranged for the 
assets to establish the businesses and that Lori Blatstein did not know 
that she was a joint owner of the 
corporations. 4 As the bankruptcy court noted, Pennsylvania law presumes 
that property titled to a husband 
and wife is owned by them as tenants by the entireties even if only one 
spouse paid for the property or even 
if one spouse was unaware of her ownership of the property. Main II, 213 
B.R. at 93 (relying upon In re 
Estate of Holmes, 200 A.2d 745, 747 (Pa. 1964)). Because the Blatsteins 
always had held their corporate 
shares as tenants by the entireties, Blatstein never "transferred" any 
shares to his wife, and thus could not 
have fraudulently transferred the shares to her. Accordingly, we will 
affirm the district and bankruptcy courts 
on this point. 
_________________________________________________________________  
 
4. We do not deal with a situation in which it is claimed that there was a 
fraudulent transfer of assets to a 
jointly owned corporation and that that transfer should be set aside. Arch 
Street repeatedly sets forth that it 
was the titling of the stock that was the fraudulent transfer. Thus, it 
states the issue as follows: "Whether the 
bankruptcy court (and district court) erred in ruling that Blatstein's 
titling of the stock of his corporation in the 
names of Blatstein and Lori Blatstein as tenants by the entireties, while 
Blatstein was insolvent, were not 
fraudulent transfers." Br. at 2. See also br. at 26, 29-30, 47. 3. 
Blatstein's income "transfers"  
 
We reject, however, the bankruptcy court's conclusions with respect to 
Blatstein's income transfers to Lori's 
personal bank accounts. Unquestionably, Lori would have been entitled to 
dividends from the corporations. 
So we would uphold transfers of that nature. But the bankruptcy court held 
that Eric's income checks 
constituted income of that character because the checks "were not the same 
as paychecks from a third-party 
employer," but instead "could be viewed as distributions of dividends or 
equity from the corporations. . . ." 
Main III, 1997 WL 626544, at *6 (emphasis added).  
 
We reject this conclusion. First, the payments were made by the 
corporations only to Blatstein and not to 
Lori Blatstein. Furthermore, the form of payments reflected reality as 
Blatstein undoubtedly operated the 
businesses. In fact, as Arch Street pointed out in its brief and again at 
oral argument, Blatstein treated his 
paychecks as wages or Schedule C sole-proprietorship income on his tax 
returns and not as dividends or 
distributions to a shareholder. Br. at 45. Likewise, the corporations 
treated the payments as wages or 
commissions and not as distributions to a shareholder.  
 
While the bankruptcy court viewed the determination of the character of 
the income as a factual matter, even 
reviewing for clear error, see Brown, 951 F.2d at 567, we are "left with 
the definite and firm conviction that 
a mistake has been committed." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 
333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 
525, 542 (1948). Consequently, we hold that the court's finding that 
Blatstein did not transfer his income to 
Lori Blatstein was clearly erroneous. In sum, we see no reason why income 
that in form and fact was earned 
for services should be reclassified as dividends or equity distributions.  
 
Our conclusion that Blatstein's income was earned income leads us to 
consider the bankruptcy court'sfinding 
that he deposited his income into Lori's accounts because his credit and 
reputation with banks was poor, 
and because he "was trying to keep the funds from being seized or frozen 
by the IRS or other taxing 
authorities, pursuant to a tax lien, in light of the personal income taxes 
which he owed to the IRS." Main II, 
213 B.R. at 94. The bankruptcy court further noted that "taxes were paid 
from[a brokerage] Account, and 
therefore no fraud on the IRS or other taxing authorities appears to have 
been effected." Id. These findings 
are significant because, notwithstanding the bankruptcy court's contrary 
conclusion, they clearly demonstrate 
that despite the payment of some taxes, Blatstein intended to defraud the 
Internal Revenue Service, one of 
his creditors.  
 
PUFTA does not require proof to set aside a transfer that the debtor 
intended to defraud the specific 
creditor bringing the fraudulent transfer claim. PUFTA deems a transfer 
fraudulent if the debtor had the 
"actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor. . . ." 12 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5104 (emphasis 
added). Similarly, the courts apply the bankruptcy code's denial of 
discharge provision, 11 U.S.C. § 
727(a)(2)(A), to "require[ ] only that the debtor make the transfer with 
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud`a 
creditor.' There is no requirement that the debtor intend to hinder all of 
his creditors." Adeeb, 787 F.2d at 
1343.  
 
We recognize that the bankruptcy court indicated that Blatstein intended 
to shield the income to pay some of 
his debts, including reducing some of his tax liability as the court noted 
that "taxes were paid from [a 
brokerage] Account, and therefore no fraud on the IRS or other taxing 
authorities appears to have been 
effected." Main II, 213 B.R. at 94. Nevertheless, as the Adeeb court 
stated: "Our inquiry under [11 U.S.C. 
§ ] 727(a)(2)(A) is whether [debtor] intended to hinder or delay a 
creditor. If he did, he had the intent 
penalized by the statute notwithstanding any other motivation he may have 
had for the transfer." 787 F.2d at 
1343. We will apply the same principle under PUFTA. See also In re Greene, 
202 B.R. 68, 73 (Bankr. D. 
Md. 1996) (holding that debtor's attempt to avoid one creditor's 
collection efforts in an effort to allow him to 
pay other creditors "does not change the fact that Debtor transferred . . 
. assets with the actual intent to 
hinder" a creditor); In re Cooper, 150 B.R. 462, 467 (D. Colo. 1993) 
(holding transfers to wife were 
fraudulent even though wife was one of debtor's creditors); United States 
v. Purcell , 798 F. Supp. 1102, 
1113 (E.D. Pa. 1991), aff 'd, 972 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1992) (table) 
(finding a conveyance fraudulent under 
PUFTA's predecessor when defendant attempted to avoid federal tax lien by 
conveying his property to his 
wife as a tenant by the entireties). Thus, we conclude that the bankruptcy 
court's determination that Blatstein 
did not have the actual intent to defraud his creditors was erroneous.5  
 
Furthermore, although not necessary for our result, we note that the 
bankruptcy court erred in its 
"constructive fraud" analysis by incorrectly placing on Arch Street the 
burden of proving that reasonably 
equivalent value was not given for the transfer: "[W]e believe that lack 
of `reasonably equivalent value' for 
the transfer is not proven. . . ." Main III, 1997 WL 626544, at *6. In 
fact, if the grantor is in debt at the time 
of a transfer PUFTA places on the grantee the burden of proving by clear 
and convincing evidence either 
that the grantor was solvent at the time of the transfer or that the 
grantee had given reasonably equivalent 
value for the conveyance. See Elliott v. Kiesewetter, 98 F.3d 47, 56- 57 
(3d Cir. 1996).6 Inasmuch, as the 
bankruptcy court found that, "the record supports Blatstein's insolvency 
at the time of his transfers to Lori," 
Main III, 1997 WL 626544, at *6, Lori could have defeated a constructive 
fraud claim solely by proving 
that she gave adequate consideration for the transfers. 
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5. The bankruptcy court also ignored (without explanation) an admission by 
Lori Blatstein in a pre-trial 
deposition that"the Arch judgment was a factor" in the Blatsteins' 
decision to put Blatstein's income into her 
personal accounts. Main II, 213 B.R. at 93-94. This testimony demonstrates 
that, in addition to avoiding the 
IRS's tax lien, Blatstein also intended to hinder Arch Street's attempts 
to collect its judgment, and provides 
another basis for our conclusion that he possessed the actual intent to 
defraud his creditors under PUFTA.  
 
6. Moreover, according to a long-standing district court case, this burden 
may be heavier on a grantor's wife 
when she is the grantee: "the burden is on the wife to show by clear and 
satisfactory evidence, beyond that 
required of other creditors, that at the time of the transfer he was 
solvent or that she paid full consideration." 
Winter v. Welker, 174 F. Supp. 836, 843 (E.D. Pa. 1959). The bankruptcy 
court found Blatstein's 
testimony on this issue to be credible and relied upon it to hold that 
Lori had given reasonably equivalent 
value for the deposit of his income into her accounts. Specifically, the 
court reasoned that Lori received 
income from Blatstein that ultimately could be viewed as a dividend on her 
half-ownership of the 
corporations, and used this income to pay off certain of the Blatsteins' 
joint debts as well as debts owed by 
the corporations. Id.  
 
Yet, by failing to place the burden on Lori to prove that she gave 
reasonable consideration, the court did not 
adopt the more plausible interpretation of the facts: that Blatstein 
retained control over the funds despite 
transferring them to his wife. Lori Blatstein used the funds both for her 
benefit and that of her husband for 
such purposes as paying their joint debts and putting aside money for 
their children's college educations. 
These payments suggest that Blatstein's conveyances were in title only, 
and that instead of giving her 
husband consideration in the form of payment of his debts, Lori merely was 
using the money where Blatstein 
directed her to use it.  
 
In this regard we note that the bankruptcy court, which had an opportunity 
to observe the Blatsteins testify, 
described Lori's role "as a faithful spouse, homemaker, and occasional 
business partner." Without shifting 
the burden of proof to Lori on the consideration issue, the bankruptcy 
court could not make a proper ruling 
on the point. Nevertheless, in light of our holding that Blatstein 
possessed an actual intent to defraud his 
creditors, it is not necessary for us to remand for consideration of the 
income transfers under the 
constructive fraud provisions of PUFTA.  
 
D. The alter ego claims  
 
Arch Street's final argument on appeal is that the bankruptcy and district 
courts erred in failing to reverse 
pierce the veils of the Blatsteins' corporations to satisfy Blatstein's 
debts. Arch Street contends that the 
bankruptcy court made the necessary factual findings yet erred in applying 
the law to these findings, resulting 
in its erroneous conclusion that the Blatsteins' corporations were not 
Blatstein's alter egos and that they were 
not the alter egos of each other.7  
 
The bankruptcy court held that the Blatsteins' corporations were not 
Blatstein's alter egos despite the 
presence of some factors that weighed in favor of piercing the corporate 
veils. For example, the court found 
that the corporations paid numerous personal expenses of the Blatsteins 
and made interest-free loans to 
them. Main II, 213 B.R. at 89-90. Nevertheless, the court declined to 
pierce the corporate veils, primarily 
by relying on Arch Street's expert's testimony on cross-examination. The 
expert recognized that the 
Blatsteins declared these amounts on their joint income tax returns as 
income, and that the corporations took 
deductions on their tax returns for these amounts. Id. at 91. Moreover, 
while he recognized that as a result 
of the interaction between Blatstein and Main, Main did not owe Blatstein 
money (which would indicate that 
Blatstein had invested heavily in Main to hide his assets in the 
corporation), he noted that Blatstein owed 
Main $402,000. Id. Further, he noted that while the corporations paid 
$269,000 of the Blatsteins' personal 
expenses, the Blatsteins paid $360,000 of the corporations' expenses. Id.  
 
The court also recounted that Blatstein's expert's testimony supported 
upholding the corporate form. The 
expert testified that the corporate transactions were not made to hinder 
Blatstein's creditors, and that "since 
there were no transfers to the corporations from Blatstein, he could not 
have technically engaged in any 
fraudulent conveyance." Id. Moreover, the expert indicated that the 
transfers to Blatstein actually benefitted 
his creditors, and that closely-held corporations often grant interest-
free loans to their officers and pay their 
officers' expenses as long as these amounts are reflected on their books 
as compensation. Id. In fact, he 
testified that it would be 
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7. Arch Street does not press vigorously before us its claim that the 
corporations were each others' alter 
egos which is weaker than its claim that they were Blatstein's alter egos. 
For this reason, and in light of our 
rejection of Arch Street's stronger alter ego claim, we will affirm the 
district court's rejection of it without 
discussion. unusual for a corporation to charge interest in such a 
situation. Id. at 92.  
 
Thus, the court concluded, that while some factors weighed in favor of 
piercing the corporate veils, the lack 
of evidence of other factors was dispositive. First, the court found "no 
proof that the various corporations . .. 
were in existence only to benefit [Blatstein's] private concerns." Id. at 
91. In fact, it appeared that all of the 
corporations other than Main were financially stable and successful 
businesses. Id. Second, the court found 
no proof in the record to support a conclusion that the Blatsteins abused 
the corporate form for illegitimate 
purposes. Id. Third, the court found that each corporation adhered to 
corporate formalities by keeping its 
own financial records and bank accounts and by recording each loan granted 
to the Blatsteins. Id. Finally, 
the court concluded that except for the fraudulent transfers regarding 
Main, none of the corporations 
committed any fraudulent acts, nor was there evidence that Blatstein 
siphoned funds either in or out of them. 
Id. at 92. Thus, except for the fraudulent transfers of Main, neither 
Blatstein nor the other corporations 
worked injustice upon the creditors, and hence equity did not require 
piercing the corporate veils. Id.  
 
After setting forth the appropriate legal precepts, the district court 
agreed with the bankruptcy court's 
assessment. Blatstein, 226 B.R. at 158-59. The court emphasized that while 
the corporations paid the 
Blatsteins' personal expenses and provided them with interest-free loans, 
these amounts were recorded in 
the corporate ledgers and were reported to the IRS as income. Id. at 159. 
The court also emphasized the 
fact that "rather than using the corporate entities to shelter funds 
otherwise available to his creditors, Blatstein 
was a net debtor to his corporations, owing Main in excess of $400,000." 
Id. Therefore, the district court 
affirmed the bankruptcy court's refusal to pierce the corporate veils. Id. 
We will affirm the district court on 
this point. Pennsylvania law, applicable here, recognizes a strong 
presumption against piercing the corporate 
veil. See Lumax Indus., Inc. v. Aultman, 669 A.2d 893, 895 (Pa. 1995). The 
"classical" piercing of the 
corporate veil is an equitable remedy whereby a court disregards "the 
existence of the corporation to make 
the corporation's individual principals and their personal assets liable 
for the debts of the corporation." In re 
Schuster, 132 B.R. 604, 607 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991). In those instances, we 
have stated that the factors 
weighing in favor of piercing the veil include:  
 
failure to observe corporate formalities, non-payment of dividends, 
insolvency of the debtor corporation at 
the time, siphoning of funds of the corporation by the dominant 
shareholder, non-functioning of other officers 
or directors, absence of corporate records, and the fact that the 
corporation is merely a facade for the 
operations of the dominant stockholder or stockholders.  
 
Kaplan v. First Options of Chicago, Inc., 19 F.3d 1503, 1521 (3d Cir. 
1994) (internal quotation marks 
omitted), aff'd, 514 U.S. 938, 115 S.Ct. 1920 (1995). We also recognized 
in Kaplan that courts sometimes 
consider undercapitalization a relevant factor, and that  
 
[n]ot every disregard of corporate formalities or failure to maintain 
corporate records justifies piercing the 
corporate veil. That remedy is available only if it is also shown that a 
corporation's affairs and personnel 
were manipulated to such an extent that it became nothing more than a sham 
used to disguise the alter ego's 
use of its assets for his own benefit in fraud of its creditors. In short, 
the evidence must show that the 
corporation's owners abused the legal separation of a corporation from its 
owners and used the corporation 
for illegitimate purposes.  
 Id.  
 
While a classical piercing renders a shareholder responsible for the 
actions of the corporation, in a " 
`reverse' piercing, assets of the corporate entity are used to satisfy the 
debts of a corporate insider so that 
the corporate entity and the individual will be considered one and the 
same." In re Mass, 178 B.R. 626, 627 
(M.D. Pa. 1995). See also In re Schuster, 132 B.R. at 607. It is not 
surprising that it has been recognized 
that only "exceptional circumstances" warrant granting this "unusual" 
remedy. In re Mass, 178 B.R. at 627. 
Consequently, a court should use its equitable powers to disregard the 
corporate form only if reverse 
piercing of the veil "will prevent fraud, illegality, injustice, [or] a 
contravention of public policy. . . ." In re 
Mass, 178 B.R. at 629 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 
The district court in Mass did uphold the bankruptcy court's decision to 
reverse pierce the corporate veil of 
Mountain Cleaners, the debtors' corporation in that case. 178 B.R. at 631. 
Borrowing the analysis of 
Schuster, 132 B.R. 604, the court analyzed the "balance between debtor's 
and creditor's remedies which 
the bankruptcy system is intended to serve." Mass, 178 B.R. at 629. The 
law imposes this balance whereby 
the "debtor receives the equitable remedy of discharge and the creditor 
the remedy of receiving a pro rata 
share of the value which the [Bankruptcy] Code dictates must be available 
to creditors after the debtor's 
`fresh start.' " Id. at 629-30.  
 
After applying this balancing test, the Mass court decided that the facts 
warranted a reverse piercing:  
 
In this case, there was a total failure to observe any corporate 
formalities by the debtors; there were no 
directors' or shareholders' meetings and no dividends were paid; there are 
no corporate records; no 
corporate tax records were maintained; the business premises were not 
leased to the corporation; and at no 
time was the dry cleaning business conducted as a corporate entity. At all 
times the debtors used the 
proceeds of the business as if they were the assets of the individual 
debtors themselves.  
 
Id. at 630. In contrast the bankruptcy court in this case simply did not 
find equivalent factors present.  
 
Furthermore, the Mass court found significant the fact that the debtors 
had changed a personal business 
account into a corporate account yet continued using the account for 
personal expenses after filing the 
Chapter 11 proceeding. Id. at 628. Indeed, "the debtors maintained no 
other bank accounts, personal or 
business, during the bankruptcy case." Id. In fact, the only corporate 
actions the debtors had taken were the 
transfer of their checking account into the corporation's name and the 
execution of an equipment lease with a 
telephone company that lay at the crux of the suit. Id.8 Accordingly, the 
court held that "the account at issue 
served as the exclusive `debtor-in- possession' account" and that " `it 
was estate funds, not `corporate' 
funds, that were placed in the account.' " Id. at 631.  
 
The situation here is different. Although the Blatsteins did not run their 
corporations as strictly separate 
entities, they did uphold the corporate form sufficiently by having the 
corporations keep separate records 
and bank accounts, and entering on the books all loans the corporations 
made to each other and to the 
shareholders.  
 
Moreover, this case lacks an equitable justification for reverse piercing 
the corporate veils. Arch Street 
contends that the limited commingling of funds and payment of personal 
expenses by the corporations was 
part of an elaborate plan by which Blatstein was attempting to frustrate 
his creditors' collection efforts. 
Although such an assertion, if true, might provide the equitable 
justification otherwise absent here, the 
bankruptcy court found the opposite to be true. The bankruptcy court found 
that Blatstein did not hide any 
of his personal assets in the corporations, nor did he commingle his 
assets with the corporations' assets so 
that separation would be impossible. We find no basis in the record to 
justify a conclusion that the court's 
finding was clearly erroneous. Hence, unlike in Mass, the assets that in 
this case are corporate assets in form 
are, in fact, corporate assets and are not part of Blatstein's bankruptcy 
estate. Consequently, we uphold the 
district court's order affirming the bankruptcy court's decision to deny 




8. Basically, Bell Atlantic had leased the corporation some telephone 
equipment, and was attempting to 
receive full payment of the lease after the corporation breached its 
contract. The debtors and the trustee of 
the bankruptcy estate brought the action to pierce the corporate veil of 
the cleaning business to bring the 
corporation's assets into the bankruptcy estate and thus force Bell 
Atlantic to advance its claim through the 
estate.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the portion of the district 
court's order affirming the bankruptcy 
court's order holding that Blatstein did not fraudulently transfer his 
income to Lori Blatstein's personal bank 
accounts, and will affirm the portions of the district court's order 
affirming the bankruptcy court's 
determinations concerning the alleged fraudulent transfers of corporate 
shares and refusal to reverse pierce 
the corporate veils of the Blatsteins' corporations. We will remand the 
case to the district court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. The parties will bear their own 
costs on this appeal. ROSENN, 
Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting:  
 
I concur and join with the majority except with respect to the alter ego 
issue and the question relating to 
Blatstein's transfer of stock to his wife, Lori. I do not reach this 
latter issue in light of my position on alter 
ego. As to the former issue, I believe that this record establishes that 
at all times Eric Blatstein1 used the 
non-debtor corporations as his personal pawns. He manipulated them at will 
to hinder and avoid his 
personal creditors by unrestrictedly drawing checks on each of them to 
meet personal expenses, purchases, 
and other obligations. He ignored the corporate form and the separate 
personalities of the corporations. I, 
therefore, respectfully dissent on the alter ego claims.  
 
As president and chief executive officer, Blatstein controlled and 
dominated the corporations' finances, 
policies, and business practices. Except for obtaining the articles of 
incorporation, only minimum corporate 
formalities were observed. Although the Blatsteins claimed they owned the 
corporate stock by the entireties, 
Lori Blatstein, his wife, did not know she owned any corporate stock, 
possessed no certificate, and she 
made no payment for any.  
 
Extensive corporate loans were obtained and extended without corporate 
resolutions, either formal or 
informal, and there were no meetings of the board of directors or 
stockholders. When Blatstein deemed it 
desirable, the corporations engaged in fraudulent transfers, not only by 
Main, but with the participation of 
CFI and Columbusco. The corporate form was ignored whenever it suited 
Blatstein's convenience. Blatstein 
also fraudulently transferred his income derived from the corporations to 
Lori's bank account. For these 
reasons and more, as I discuss infra, I believe the corporate veil as to 
all corporate defendants should be 
pierced to avoid manifest injustice.  
 
I.  
 The doctrine that a corporation is a legal entity separate and apart from 
the shareholders composing it is a 
legal _________________________________________________________________  
 
1. References in this dissent to "Blatstein" are to Eric Blatstein only. 
fiction designed to serve convenience 
and justice. It will be disregarded whenever justice or public policy 
demands. "[W]henever one in control of 
a corporation uses that control, or uses the corporate assets, to further 
his or her own personal interests, the 
fiction of the separate entity may properly be disregarded." Ragan v. Tri-
County Excavating, Inc., 62 F.3d 
501, 508 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Ashley v. Ashley, 393 A.2d 637, 641 (Pa. 
1978)).  
 
Although courts will not lightly pierce a corporate veil, nevertheless in 
an appropriate case and in furtherance 
of the ends of justice, a corporation and the persons who own its stock 
and assets will be treated as 
identical. Cunningham v. Rendezvous, Inc., 699 F.2d 676, 680 (4th Cir. 
1983); Hanrahan v. Audubon 
Builders, Inc., 614 A.2d 748, 753 (Pa. Super. 1992). The effect of such a 
decision in this case 
appropriately would sweep all of the assets of the non-debtor defendants 
into the Blatstein estate, an 
objective sought by the trustees and the other plaintiffs, and one that is 
just. In United States v. Pisani, 646 
F.2d 83, 88 (3d Cir. 1981), we fashioned a federal rule and held that the 
corporate entity could be 
disregarded and the principal stockholder held liable to a creditor of the 
corporation where relevant factors 
as set forth in DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 
540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1976), 
showed that piercing the corporate veil was appropriate.  
 
Factors to be considered in whether to pierce a corporate veil are gross 
undercapitalization and  
 
failure to observe corporate formalities, non-payment of dividends, the 
insolvency of the debtor corporation 
at the time, siphoning of funds of the corporation by the dominant 
stockholder, non-functioning of other 
officers or directors, absence of corporate records, and the fact that the 
corporation is merely a facade for 
the operations of the dominant stockholder or stockholders.  
 
Pisani, 646 F.2d at 88 (quoting DeWitt Truck Brokers, 540 F.2d at 686-87).  
 
In Pisani, this court also found relevant additional factors favoring 
piercing the corporate veil, such as 
operating the corporation with large sums loaned by the stockholder to the 
corporation and repayment with 
corporate funds while the corporation was failing, and keeping the 
corporation undercapitalized by lending it 
money instead of investing equity. Id.  
 
As the majority observes, the bankruptcy court, relying heavily on 
testimony of defendants' expert witness, 
Miller, declined to pierce the corporate veil. The bankruptcy judge relied 
on Miller, although he realized that 
Miller's experience with debtors of questionable moral and legal standards 
"may have jaded his 
perceptions." Main II, 213 B.R. at 82. He also thought that Miller was 
"occasionally over-aggressive in 
defending himself from what he claimed were distortions of the facts 
introduced by Plaintiffs' counsel." Id. at 
77. Miller apparently impressed the bankruptcy court with his general 
thesis that in his experience, "he had 
observed all or most of the practices at issue and found them acceptable 
business practices." Id. Two or 
more wrongs, however, do not make a right and, in some instances, Miller's 
testimony has the ring of judge 
and jury, as well as expert.  
 
As the majority observes, the bankruptcy court found no proof that the 
various corporations were in 
existence only to benefit Blatstein's private concerns, or for 
illegitimate purposes. It also appeared to the 
court that all of the corporations other than Main were financially stable 
and successful businesses. As I 
discuss below, they were not. In addition, the court found that each 
corporation adhered to corporate 
formalities by keeping its own financial records and bank accounts, and by 
recording each loan granted to 
the Blatsteins. I disagree with the court's conclusions, some of which are 
couched as findings, for reasons 
that follow, and I do not believe that keeping financial records by each 
corporation is sufficient to determine 
whether they adhered to corporate formalities in light of the evidence to 
the contrary.2 The bankruptcy court 
ignored significant factors that justify piercing the corporate veil. 
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2. This court reviews the bankruptcy court's legal conclusions de novo, 
factual findings for clear error, and 
exercises of discretion for abuse of discretion. See Interface Group-
Nevada, Inc. v. Trans World Airlines, 
Inc. (In re Trans World Airlines, Inc.), 145 F.3d 124, 130-31 (3d Cir. 
1998). This court has plenary review 
of the district court's order. Id. I believe an analysis of the alter ego 
issue must begin with an understanding 
of the role and character of the principal players in the activities of 
the corporations.  
 
The architect in the formation of the non-debtor corporations is Eric 
Blatstein, now bankrupt and insolvent 
since 1980 when the IRS filed a lien against all of his property. His 
wife, Lori, collaborated with him, serving 
"as a faithful spouse, homemaker, and occasional business partner." Main 
II, 213 B.R. at 77. Also playing 
an important role is Morris Lift, Blatstein's accountant andfinancier. 
Lift made loans to Blatstein or on 
Blatstein's behalf to the corporations through various unwritten 
arrangements. Actively participating in the 
"sham foreclosure" of Main and the fraudulent transfer of some of its 
assets to some of the non-debtor 
corporations, he assisted Blatstein in his persistent efforts to defeat 
the claims of his creditors. According to 
the bankruptcy court:  
 
Prior to July 1996, Blatstein was the chief executive officer ("CEO") and 
president of all of the corporate 
Defendants. He remains as president and CEO of all of the corporate 
defendants except Main, of which Lift 
became president as of July 1996 after "foreclosing" on the assets and 
stock of Main on July 25, 1996. 
Blatstein has final decision-making power and is the sole individual with 
check writing authority for all of the 
corporations in issue, including Main, the latter of which all of the 
defense witnesses agree Lift allowed him 
to continue to "run" after the "foreclosure" by Lift. The employees of all 
of these corporations act under 
Blatstein's direction.  
 
Id. at 74.  
 
The bankruptcy court also found that Lift had been an "insider" of some of 
the debtors in the critical months 
prior to their filing; that Lift's foreclosure on his note against Main of 
its assets was a sham transaction, and 
that"the transfer of most or all of Main's assets to a series of other 
Blatstein-controlled entities within the year 
prior to the bankruptcy filings constituted `actual' fraudulent 
conveyances which must be set aside." Id. at 
67. The collusive foreclosure sale was arranged to prevent Arch from 
executing on its judgment against 
Main's assets. The court found Lift's claims of innocence not credible, 
id. at 81, and found him to be "a 
willing accomplice to a fraudulent conveyance." Id. at 81-82. The court 
found the credibility of Lift and 
Blatstein highly questionable as to numerous issues throughout the trial. 
Id. at 13.  
 
The bankruptcy court was convinced that at all times Blatstein had been 
"in control of the corporate 
defendants' management and operations." The court was also persuaded that 
when Blatstein testified that he 
directed Shoop, the controller for each of the corporations, to deposit 
all funds of Main after its bank 
accounts were garnished, and all of Main's accounts receivable, into 
Reedco's accounts and later into CFI's 
accounts, this testimony constituted an admission "that his intentions 
were to hinder and/or delay Arch from 
executing on its judgment against Main." Id. at 83. The court also 
rejected Miller's attempts to trivialize this 
wrongdoing as a standard business practice. Id. The court found that the 
transfers orchestrated by Blatstein 
rendered Main "an insolvent, worthless shell," and constituted an actual 
fraudulent conveyance of Main 
assets to Reedco, CFI, Lift and Columbusco within one year of Blatstein's 
bankruptcy. Main II, 213 B.R. at 
83.  
 
I turn now to an analysis of the corporate ownership. Although the 
Blatsteins professed to hold the capital 
stock of each of the corporations by the entireties, this representation 
is suspect. Blatstein testified that his 
wife Lori did not pay for stock in the corporations and wrote no check in 
purchase of the stock. Lori also 
admitted that she did not know whether she owned stock in the 
corporations, and, after an effort to evade 
answering questions pertaining to her stock interest, testified that no 
stock certificate was ever issued to her. 




3. Lori testified:  
 
Q. That wasn't my question. The question was, isn't it true you have never 
been given a stock certificate that 
has your name on it. confronted with his federal tax returns prepared by 
Lift and returns filed with the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Blatstein admitted that each of them 
reported, under Blatstein's oath, that 
he was the sole owner of the corporations.  
 
The plaintiffs assert that Blatstein treated the corporations as a single 
entity. I agree. The Waterfront 
Management Corporation was organized for the purpose of managing all of 
the corporations and Shoop 
served as controller, as well as controller for each of the non-debtor 
corporations. Blatstein instructed 
Shoop that if one of his corporations lacked sufficient funds to pay its 
bills to use the funds of another 
corporation. For example, in 1996 the aggregate expenses paid by one 
corporation on behalf of another 
amounted to $554,749, a not insignificant sum. These frequent intercompany 
payments do not show 
"financially stable and successful businesses." A corporation charged no 
interest on intercompany"loans" and 
there was no agreement as to when or how they were to be repaid. Id. at 
92. The court found that these 
intercompany transactions were numerous; the court noted that Airbev paid 
$150,000 of Delawareco's 
taxes. Engine 46 paid the start up costs for Airbev, and Main did the same 
for Reedco. Id. The companies 
also made frequent 
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A. Yes.  
 
Q. And you have not paid cash to purchase stock in any of the companies 
that your husband runs, is that 
correct?  
 
A. Correct.  
 
Q. And you don't think that you ever wrote a check to purchase stock in 
any of the companies that your 
husband runs, is that correct?  
 
A. Not that I can recall.  
 
Q. As a matter of fact, you can't tell if you ever paid anything to 
purchase stock in any of the companies that 
your husband runs, is that right?  
 
* * *  
 
A. Not that I can recall. payments on Blatstein's $500,000 personal tax 
liability to the Internal Revenue 
Service on his prior companies that failed. It is evident that the 
corporations were grossly undercapitalized; 
they each borrowed money from each other for start up costs and for 
capital.  
 
The various corporations paid personal expenses of Blatstein, which were 
treated as loans. "No loan 
documents were ever executed," id., and there were no documents to show 
when they would be repaid. 
The records were unclear to the court regarding how much money Blatstein 
owed Main on monies 
advanced in his behalf for payment of personal expenses, although one 
exhibit introduced at trial showed a 
sum in excess of $400,000. Id.  
 
Essentially, Blatstein used his corporations as his personal bank. 
Whenever Blatstein paid his personal 
obligations, whether expenses, real estate purchases, personal taxes or 
old debts, he drew checks on the 
corporations. He had no personal bank account. In August 1996, Columbusco 
paid $39,000 for his 
personal expenses. The 1995 tax return for Delawareco alone showed 
outstanding loans to shareholders of 
$283,570. In 1996, the corporation paid $269,117 for Blatstein's personal 
expenses. The corporations 
made a large down payment for his Bucks County estate and afterward 
payments on the remaining debt, 
and wages for a horse trainer and stable hand. The bankruptcy court 
summarized some of the evidence 
relating to Blatstein's personal expenses as follows:  
 
At trial, Shoop testified that numerous personal expenses of the 
Blatsteins were paid by the various 
corporations, including expenses for a horse trainer hired by the 
Blatsteins, loan payments to Lift for money 
loaned to the Blatsteins for the purchase of their home, and payments of 
Blatstein's personal income tax 
debts owed to the Internal Revenue Service ("the IRS"). This testimony was 
confirmed by Blatstein and Lift 
during their trial testimony as well, and by numerous financial documents 
introduced into evidence.  
 
Main II, 213 B.R. at 89. The bankruptcy court further found: Loans from 
the corporate defendants to the 
Blatsteins include the $140,000 down payment that Pier 53 made on the 
Blatstein residence, which was 
purchased in 1994. The monthly mortgage payments on this loan are made by 
Delawareco and Main. In 
addition, Delawareco and Columbusco made the payments on Blatstein's 
personal federal income tax 
liability. The Beratans were being repaid with $1,000 per week payments 
from Main and its successor 
entities, e.g., Reedco, [Chicken Fingers], and Columbusco.  
 
Id. at 90.  
 
In addition, Blatstein siphoned large sums of money as "loans" or "wages" 
from the corporations, 
notwithstanding their gross undercapitalization and their scurrying to 
borrow money from each other to stay 
afloat. For the year 1996, he drew $555,288 in gross wages from Waterfront 
Management Corporation. 
These funds were deposited in Lori's bank accounts. His personal IRS 
return for 1995 showed gross wages 
of almost $500,000. These funds also went into his wife's account, which 
this court now holds constituted 
fraudulent transfers.  
 
Despite the bankruptcy court's negative findings as to Blatstein's 
credibility and his fraudulent activity to 
avoid paying creditors, the continuous and extensive payment of his 
personal obligations by the corporations 
and the non- observance of the corporate forms or ordinary business 
practices, the bankruptcy court, 
largely persuaded by Miller, refused to pierce the corporate veil. Miller, 
the defendants' expert, opined that 
there was nothing wrong with a corporation directly paying the expenses of 
a dominant shareholder. That 
depends, however, upon whether the payments are occasional, the amount, 
and the financial status of the 
dominant shareholder, whether he is a person of worth or insolvent and 
without assets, and whether the 
corporations are financially stable or severely undercapitalized.  
 
The Pennsylvania Superior Court in Hanrahan v. Audubon Builders, Inc. held 
that where corporate funds 
were utilized, in the form of direct payments, as is the case here, from 
the corporations' accounts for the 
shareholders' personal expenses, including expenses at their home, for 
personal jewelry, personal mortgage 
payments, and their son's private school tuition, piercing the corporate 
veil was appropriate. 614 A.2d at 
753. The salient considerations here demonstrate that the personal 
expenses and other substantial personal 
obligations were paid and the large withdrawals permitted because 
Blatstein made the decision, he drew the 
checks, and corporate formalities were ignored.  
 
I believe that Miller, who the judge acknowledged might have had "jaded 
perceptions" because of his prior 
experiences with debtors of dubious practices, misled the court. Miller 
applied his own personal "measuring 
stick" to reach for his conclusion that the corporate defendants were not 
Blatstein's alter ego. Id. at 92. 
Miller and the bankruptcy judge compartmentalized Blatstein's 
improprieties as isolated, discrete acts 
instead of viewing the totality of all the circumstances surrounding 
Blatstein's wide range of activities with the 
corporations. Miller attempted to minimize the number and amounts of 
Blatstein's personal expenses paid by 
offering his own formula. He took 1996 total gross revenues of the 
corporate defendants and divided it by 
Blatstein's personal expenses to come up with 3.89% as representative of 
the total gross revenues paid for 
personal expenses. With this approach, he ignored the net earnings of the 
corporations, treated the 
corporations as a single entity for this purpose, and gave no 
consideration to Blatstein's disregard of the 
corporate form and the separate personalities of the corporations and the 
individual. In DeWitt Truck 
Brokers, which we cited with approval in Pisani, the court noted 
that"[t]he conclusion to disregard the 
corporate entity may not, however, rest on a single factor." 540 F.2d at 
687.  
 
Miller concluded that technically no fraudulent transfers in the form of 
company loans occurred because the 
transfers were from solvent corporations. They were barely solvent, 
however, only if the loans to an 
insolvent Blatstein are considered in the calculation. Of greater 
relevance and importance than the solvency 
of the corporations, however, in determining whether the corporate veil 
should be pierced are the character, 
quantity, and frequency of the intercompany loans and the payment of 
Blatstein's expenses, all made solely 
at Blatstein's behest and accomplished in total disregard of ordinary 
corporate business practices. These 
corporations not only made loans to each other but they directly issued 
their checks to creditors in payment 
of another corporation's bill and then booked the same as an inter-company 
loan. As the court noted in 
DeWitt Truck Brokers, "undercapitalization, coupled with disregard of 
corporate formalities, lack of 
participation on the part of the other stockholders, and the failure to 
pay dividends while paying substantial 
sums, whether by way of salary or otherwise, to the dominant stockholder 
... has been regarded fairly 
uniformly to constitute a basis for an imposition of individual liability 
under the doctrine." 540 F.2d at 687.  
 
Miller's opinion also addressed the legal factors reserved for courts 
under an alter ego analysis and 
exceeded the bounds of an accounting expert in his conclusion that 
piercing the corporate veil here was not 
justified. Relying on Miller's testimony, the bankruptcy court held that 
the plaintiffs failed to carry their 
burden. I disagree, for the record provides overwhelming evidence that 
Blatstein, as the president and sole 
stockholder of each corporation, the principal, if not the only 
stockholder, with sole check drawing power, 
ignored the corporate form, and treated the corporations as a single 
entity and his alter ego. A glaring 
example of Blatstein's disregard of the corporate entity is his agreement 
without appropriate corporate 
authorization with Transmedia Network, Inc. This is an organization which 
purchases food credit for its 
members and it pays the restaurant or night club fifty cents for every 
dollar of credit purchased. A provision 
of the agreement Blatstein entered into with Transmedia is that if one of 
the Blatstein restaurants closes, food 
credits can be used at all the other restaurants in which he has an 
interest. Thus, if the restaurant that was 
paid for the food credits received all the money and thereafter closed its 
doors or could not honor the 
credits, the other restaurants operated by the corporations would make 
good to Transmedia members. He 
had a similar arrangement with the Jefferson Bank under which checks 
written by one corporation which has 
not sufficient funds will be paid by one of the other companies that has 
sufficient funds available. Blatstein, 
during the life of the corporations, has systematically schemed to avoid 
his creditors and has cleverly used 
the corporations and Lori's bank accounts to thwart their efforts. He 
avoided his creditors by keeping no 
bank accounts or property in his name to answer for his debts, but paid 
expenses and whatever other 
obligations he chose to pay with corporate funds. All family bank 
deposits, including his income, were in his 
wife's name. His personal purchases were made by one or more of the 
corporations, for he had no personal 
accounts of his own, including the purchase of his Bucks County estate. 
The corporations paid his personal 
income taxes, including personal withholding taxes owing for prior failed 
corporations. The corporations 
made large "loans" to him, although they were undercapitalized and in 
financial straits. Blatstein even 
admitted that four of these corporations, Delawareco, Reedco, Engine 46, 
and Columbusco, continued to 
make payments to him or on his behalf after they had been garnished. This 
is probative evidence of 
fraudulent conduct and abuse of the corporate entity. See Northern Tankers 
(Cyprus) Ltd. v. Backstrom, 
967 F. Supp. 1391, 1413 (D. Conn. 1997).  
 
Personal and corporate finances were intermingled. The bankruptcy court 
found that funds in the Gruntal 
account, of which $480,000 was deposited on October 3, 1995, came from 
Delawareco and was "used to 
purchase items for the Blatsteins' residence; to pay their mortgage; [and] 
to pay bills, predominantly tax 
liabilities, on behalf of the various corporate defendants." Main II, 213 
B.R. at 94 (emphasis added). As the 
president and dominant stockholder of each corporation, time after time he 
disregarded the corporate 
structure of his companies for personal purposes.  
 
In circumstances not as flagrant as we have here, this court in the past 
has pierced the corporate veil. There 
is such unity of interest, ownership and function between Blatstein and 
the non-debtor corporations that the 
separate personalities of the individual and the corporations no longer 
exist. This fusion of the corporate and 
individual personalities "may be satisfied by a showing of domination and 
control of the corporation, which 
occurs most often in the context of a parent-subsidiary relationship or of 
a closely held corporation." Note, 
Piercing the Corporate Veil: The Alter Ego Doctrine Under Federal Common 
Law, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 853, 
854-55 (1982) (emphasis added).  
 
In Kaplan v. First Options of Chicago, Inc., 19 F.3d 1503, 1521 (3d Cir. 
1994), aff 'd, 514 U.S. 938 
(1995), this court held that the corporate veil may be pierced when a 
corporation's affairs and personnel 
were manipulated to such an extent that they became nothing more than a 
sham to disguise the alter ego's 
use of their assets for his own benefit in fraud of creditors. The 
activities of the non- debtor corporations 
here show that they played a major role in meeting Blatstein's personal 
needs in assisting him in his struggle 
to hinder and avoid his creditors. Proof of fraud, however, is not 
necessary to justify piercing the corporate 
veil, although fraudulent elements are present here. Under DeWitt, it is 
clear that "the corporate veil may be 
pierced in appropriate circumstances even in the absence of fraud or 
wrongdoing." Cunningham, 699 F.2d 
at 680.  
 
The bankruptcy court was also influenced in its decision by the clearly 
erroneous belief that the non-debtor 
corporations "are financially stable and successful businesses." Main II, 
213 B.R. at 91. If relevant, which I 
doubt, the evidence is to the contrary. Each corporation frequently paid 
bills for the other and checks 
shuttled back and forth in an effort to meet expenses and creditors, all 
of which reveals the fragile financial 
condition of the companies.  
 
Despite the absence of any documents evidencing the "loans" to Blatstein, 
their terms as to repayment, 
interest, or collateral, or any corporate authorization of the loans, 
formal or informal, the court concluded 
that corporate formalities were observed because each corporation had its 
own bank account and kept its 
own financial records. However, separate bank accounts and records for 
each corporation are not alone 
sufficient proof that corporate formalities were observed and the 
corporate entity respected, particularly 
when the bank accounts were each subject to Blatstein's exclusive control 
and used for his personal 
purposes. The records kept by each corporation are ordinary business 
records without any distinctive 
corporate characteristics except that each corporation kept its own.  
 
Shoop admitted that several weeks before his final deposition in this 
case, Lift told him to clean up his 
records, which resulted in the reduction of Blatstein's loan balances 
"because my records were inaccurate." 
Shoop also acknowledged that during his service as Controller from July 
12, 1994 through 1996, he never 
issued a 1099 form to Lift showing the payment to him of interest on his 
loans to the corporations. He 
explained these annual lapses as an "oversight." He also admitted issuing 
a check to Lift for $9,000 on 
September 18, 1996, at Lift's direction which he could not explain. 
Although the foregoing illustrates that the 
corporate records were not always accurate as to Blatstein and Lift, they 
do show that in 1996, the 
corporations paid for Blatstein's personal expenses of $269,117.16 plus 
his wages for the year of 
$558,288. (256a). In undercapitalized corporations struggling to meet 
their current expenses, a withdrawal 
of $827,405 by Blatstein in one year constituted a "siphoning of funds of 
the corporation by the dominant 
stockholder." Pisani, 646 F.2d at 88.  
 
Although the majority acknowledges that "the Blatsteins did not run their 
corporations as strictly separate 
entities," it concludes that they did uphold the corporate form 
sufficiently because the corporations kept 
separate records and bank accounts, and entered on the books all loans the 
corporations made to each 
other and to the shareholders. Maj. Op. at 21. I do not believe that under 
the law of this circuit, this one 
factor should defeat an equitable result and bar the piercing of the 
corporate veil in light of the many factors 
present that demonstrate the unity of interest and ownership of Blatstein 
and his corporations that 
commenced with the initial fraudulent transfers from Main to Reedco.  
 
When one views the total picture, illuminated by the relevant factors set 
forth in DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. 
v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., which were adopted by this court in United 
States v. Pisani, justification for 
piercing the corporate veil is clear. First, the corporations were grossly 
undercapitalized. Second, corporate 
formalities were never observed, and officers and directors were non-
functional. Although the corporations 
kept separate bank accounts and separate records, this one factor is not 
determinative. Third, Blatstein, the 
dominant and, in my opinion, the sole stockholder, flagrantly siphoned 
funds from the corporations. He 
commingled personal and corporate funds. Fourth, Blatstein alone drew 
checks on the bank accounts of 
each of the corporations and corporation funds were used extensively for 
all of his personal obligations and 
expenses. Fifth, Blatstein used the corporations to hinder and delay 
creditors, including the fraudulent 
transfer of some of Main's assets in the face of garnishment proceedings 
to Reedco and Columbusco, and 
the fraudulent transfer of funds siphoned from the corporations to his 
wife's bank accounts. Finally, the total 
picture of Blatstein's activities portray that his corporations were "a 
facade for the operations of the 
dominant stockholder." Pisani, 646 F.2d at 88.  
 
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to affirm 
the district court's order affirming the 
bankruptcy court's determination not to pierce the corporate veil of 
Blatstein's corporations.  
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